

**SECURITY INFORMATION**

**CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY**

7 January 1953

**ENCLOSURE "A"**

**LIST OF INTELLIGENCE DIFFICIENCIES REVEALED IN  
THE PREPARATION OF NIE-35/1 and NIE-35/2  
(in order of priority)**

**A. Viet Minh Developments**

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] the quality of such intelligence varies greatly. This may be an insoluble problem because of the great difficulties involved in the collection process. Where at all possible, however, the scope and firmness of US estimates could be increased as a result of more reliable intelligence on:

- (1) The extent of consolidation of control over territories held or infiltrated by the Viet Minh; the political, economic, and police instruments of control; the extent to which the regime is welcome and supported; the degree of power, if any, enjoyed by non-Communist Party leadership.

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- (2) The relations, if any, between the Viet Minh and Soviets; the existence, if any, of frictions between Peking and Moscow concerning superior influence over the Viet Minh. The influence within the Viet Minh of French and other European Communist advisers.
- (3) The frictions, if any, which exist between the Viet Minh and the Chinese Communists; the effect of traditional Chinese-Indochinese ill-feeling; the existence, if any of Viet Minh "nationalist," as distinguished from "Communist," aspirations; the displacing, if any, of indigenous leadership and influence by Chinese pressure of personalities.
- (4) The logistic capabilities of the Viet Minh alone.
- (5) The Viet Minh manpower situation.
- (6) The state of morale among the Viet Minh leadership and Army, and among the population within Viet Minh-controlled territory.
- (7) The present role of Ho Chi Minh; the other important figures in the Viet Minh (backgrounds, responsibilities, etc.).

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B. Chinese Communist Developments

A situation somewhat similar to that discussed above exists as far as Chinese Communist support of the Viet Minh is concerned. There is a greater quantity of reporting on this subject than there is on the Viet Minh itself. [REDACTED]

25X1X7 [REDACTED] However, the fragmentary nature of this intelligence and the difficulties involved in establishing its reliability seriously weaken its usefulness. Where at all possible, US estimates would profit from more reliable intelligence on:

- (1) Chinese Communist capabilities with respect to Indochina: logistic support of the Viet Minh from Communist bases, sources, OB, transportation improvements, stockpiling, and air force and naval developments; economic capabilities for more active participation in Indochina.
- (2) Chinese Communist "volunteers," if any, with the Viet Minh; the number, method of integration, command relationships, training, status, function, and influence of these people.

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- (3) Chinese Communist "advisors" with the Viet Minh; the number, training, status, function, and influence of these people.

C. French Developments

More reliable intelligence would be helpful concerning:

- (1) Indications of French intentions with respect to Indochina.
- (2) Indications of French capabilities with respect to Indochina: The strain and real cost of the Indochina war to France. The pressures existing in France and in the Associated States to reduce commitments in Indochina. The ability of France to maintain, or increase, its commitments in Indochina.

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